

# JOINT CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

Authored by:

**TLP:CLEAR**

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## Threat Actors Exploiting Ivanti EPMM Vulnerabilities

### SUMMARY

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Norwegian National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NO) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to active exploitation of CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081. Advanced persistent threat (APT) actors exploited CVE-2023-35078 as a zero day from at least April 2023 through July 2023 to gather information from several Norwegian organizations, as well as to gain access to and compromise a Norwegian government agency's network.

Ivanti released a patch for CVE-2023-35078 on July 23, 2023. Ivanti later determined actors could use CVE-2023-35078 in conjunction with another vulnerability CVE-2023-35081 and released a patch for the second vulnerability on July 28, 2023. NCSC-NO observed possible vulnerability chaining of CVE-2023-35081 and CVE-2023-35078.

CVE-2023-35078 is a critical vulnerability affecting Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) (formerly known as MobileIron Core). The vulnerability allows threat actors to access personally identifiable information (PII) and gain the ability to make configuration changes on compromised systems. CVE-2023-35081 enables actors with EPMM administrator privileges to write arbitrary files with the operating system privileges of the EPMM web application server. Threat actors can chain these vulnerabilities to gain initial, privileged access to EPMM systems and execute uploaded files, such as webshells.

Mobile device management (MDM) systems are attractive targets for threat actors because they provide elevated access to thousands of mobile devices, and APT actors have exploited a previous MobileIron vulnerability. Consequently, CISA and NCSC-NO are concerned about the potential for widespread exploitation in government and private sector networks.

This CSA provides indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) obtained by NCSC-NO investigations. The CSA also includes a nuclei template to identify unpatched

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devices and detection guidance organizations can use to hunt for compromise. CISA and NCSC-NO encourage organizations to hunt for malicious activity using the detection guidance in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, organizations should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA. If no compromise is detected, organizations should still immediately apply patches released by Ivanti.

## TECHNICAL DETAILS

**Note:** This advisory uses the [MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise](#) framework, version 13. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors' activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK's [Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping](#) and CISA's [Decider Tool](#).

### Overview

In July 2023, NCSC-NO became aware of APT actors exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPMM), formerly known as MobileIron Core, to target a Norwegian government network. Ivanti confirmed that the threat actors exploited CVE-2023-35078 and released a patch on July 23, 2023.<sup>[1]</sup> Ivanti later determined actors could use CVE-2023-35078 in conjunction with another vulnerability, CVE-2023-35081, and released a patch for the second vulnerability on July 28, 2023.<sup>[2]</sup>

CVE-2023-35078 is a critical authentication bypass [\[CWE-288\]](#) vulnerability affecting Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), formerly known as MobileIron Core. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated access to specific application programming interface (API) paths. Threat actors with access to these API paths can access PII such as names, phone numbers, and other mobile device details of users on the vulnerable system; make configuration changes to vulnerable systems; push new packages to mobile endpoints; and access Global Positioning System (GPS) data if enabled.

According to Ivanti, CVE-2023-35078 can be chained with a second vulnerability [CVE-2023-35081](#).<sup>[2]</sup> CVE-2023-35081 is directory traversal vulnerability [\[CWE-22\]](#) in EPMM. This vulnerability allows threat actors with EPMM administrator privileges the capability to write arbitrary files, such as webshells, with operating system privileges of the EPMM web application server. The actors can then execute the uploaded file.<sup>[2]</sup>

CISA added CVE-2023-35078 to its [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](#) on July 25, 2023, and CVE-2023-35081 on July 31, 2023.

CISA and NCSC-NO are concerned about the potential for widespread exploitation of both vulnerabilities in government and private sector networks because MDM systems provide elevated access to thousands of mobile devices. Threat actors, including APT actors, have previously exploited a MobileIron vulnerability<sup>[3],[4]</sup>.

### APT Actor Activity

The APT actors have exploited CVE-2023-35078 since at least April 2023. The actors leveraged compromised small office/home office (SOHO) routers, including ASUS routers, to proxy [\[T1090\]](#) to

target infrastructure, and NCSC-NO observed the actors exploiting CVE-2023-35078 to obtain initial access to EPMM devices [T1190] and:

- Perform arbitrary Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) queries against the Active Directory (AD).
- Retrieve LDAP endpoints [T1018].
- Use API path `/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users` to list users and administrators [T1087.002] on the EPMM device.
- Make EPMM configuration changes (**Note:** It is unknown what configuration changes the actors made).
- Regularly check EPMM Core audit logs [T1005].

The APT actors deleted some of their entries in Apache httpd logs [T1070] using `mi.war`, a malicious Tomcat application that deletes log entries based on the string in `keywords.txt`. The actors deleted log entries with the string `Firefox/107.0`.

The APT actors used Linux and Windows user agents with `Firefox/107.0` to communicate with EPMM. Other agents were used; however, these user agents did not appear in the device logs. It is unconfirmed how the threat actors ran shell commands on the EPMM device; however, NCSC-NO suspects the actors exploited CVE-2023-35081 to upload webshells on the EPMM device and run commands [T1059].

The APT actors tunneled traffic [T1572] from the internet through Ivanti Sentry, an application gateway appliance that supports EPMM, to at least one Exchange server that was not accessible from the internet [T1090.001]. It is unknown how they tunneled traffic. NCSC-NO observed that the network traffic used the TLS certificate of the internal Exchange server. The APT actors likely installed webshells [T1505.003] on the Exchange server in the following paths [T1036.005]:

- `/owa/auth/logon.aspx`
- `/owa/auth/logoff.aspx`
- `/owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx`

NCSC-NO also observed `mi.war` on Ivanti Sentry but do not know how the actors placed it there.

## MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See Table 1–Table 7 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

*Table 1: APT Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Initial Access*

Technique Title	ID	Use
Exploit Public-Facing Application	[T1190]	The APT actors exploited CVE-2023-35078 in public facing Ivanti EPMM appliances since at least April 2023.

Table 2: APT Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Execution

Technique Title	ID	Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter	<a href="#">T1059</a>	The APT actors may have exploited CVE-2023-35081 to upload webshells on the EPMM device and run commands.

Table 3: APT Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Discovery

Technique Title	ID	Use
Account Discovery: Domain Account	<a href="#">T1087.002</a>	The APT actors exploited CVE-2021-35078 to gather EPMM device users and administrators.
Remote System Discovery	<a href="#">T1018</a>	The APT actors retrieved LDAP endpoints.

Table 4: APT Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Persistence

Technique Title	ID	Use
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location	<a href="#">T1036.005</a>	The APT actors likely installed webshells at legitimate Exchange server paths.
Server Software Component: Web Shell	<a href="#">T1505.003</a>	The APT actors implanted webshells on the compromised infrastructure.

Table 5: APT Actor ATT&CK Techniques for Defense Evasion

Technique Title	ID	Use
Indicator Removal	<a href="#">T1070</a>	APT actors deleted httpd access logs after the malicious activities took place using string <code>Firefox/107.0</code> .

Table 6: APT Actor ATT&CK Techniques for Collection

Technique Title	ID	Use
Data from Local System	<a href="#">T1005</a>	APT actors regularly checked EPMM Core audit logs.

Table 7: APT Actor ATT&CK Techniques for Command and Control

Technique Title	ID	Use
Protocol Tunneling	<a href="#">T1572</a>	The APT actors tunneled traffic from the internet to an Exchange server that was not accessible from the internet.
Proxy	<a href="#">T1090</a>	The actors leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy to and compromise infrastructure.  The actors tunneled traffic from the internet to at least one Exchange server.
Proxy: Internal Proxy	<a href="#">T1090.001</a>	The APT actors tunneled traffic from the internet to an Exchange server that was not accessible from the internet.

## EVIDENCE OF VULNERABILITY METHODS

CISA recommends administrators use the following CISA-developed nuclei template to determine vulnerability to CVE-2023-30578:

```
id: CVE-2023-35078-Exposure

info:
  name: Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access
  author: JC
  severity: critical
  reference:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35078
```

```
description: Identifies vulnerable instances of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), formerly MobileIron Core, through 11.10 allows remote attackers to obtain PII, add an administrative account, and change the configuration because of an authentication bypass.
```

```
tags: ivanti, mobileiron, epmm, auth-bypass
```

```
requests:
```

```
- method: GET
```

```
path:
```

```
- "{{RootURL}}/mifs/aad/api/v2/ping"
```

```
matchers-condition: and
```

```
matchers:
```

```
- type: status
```

```
status:
```

```
- 200
```

```
- type: word
```

```
part: body
```

```
words:
```

```
- "vspVersion"
```

```
- "apiVersion"
```

```
condition: and
```

CISA recommends administrators use the following CISA-developed nuclei template to determine vulnerability to CVE-2023-35081:

```
id: CVE-2023-35081
```

```
info:
```

```
name: Ivanti EPMM Remote Arbitrary File Write
```

author: JC

severity: High

reference:

- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35081>

description: Identifies vulnerable unpatched versions of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), formerly MobileIron Core, through 11.10.0.3, 11.9.1.2, and 11.8.1.2 that allows an authenticated administrator to perform arbitrary file writes to the EPMM server.

tags: ivanti, mobileiron, epmm

requests:

- method: GET

path:

- "{{RootURL}}/mifs/c/windows/api/v2/device/registration"

matchers-condition: and

matchers:

- type: status

status:

- 200

- type: regex

part: all

regex:

- '.\*\?VSP ((0?[0-9]|10)(\.\d+){1,3}|11\.(0?[0-7])(\.\d+){1,2}|11\.8\.0(\.\d+)?|11\.8\.1\.[0-1]|11\.9\.0(\.\d+)?|11\.9\.1\.[0-1]|11\.10\.0\.[0-2]).\*'

Run the following NCSC-NO-created checks to check for signs of compromise:

1. Investigate logs in centralized logging solutions or forwarded `syslogs` from EPMM devices for any occurrences of `/mifs/aad/api/v2/`.

2. Look for spikes or an increase of `EventCode=1644` in the AD since at least April 2023. The LDAP queries performed by EPMM when the threat actor used the MIFS API generated tens of millions of this event code. Also look for EventCodes `4662`, `5136`, and `1153`.
3. To detect tunneling activity through Sentry, look for traffic from EPMM devices to other internal servers, as well as TLS traffic towards instances of EPMM with different TLS certificates than the instance itself would possess. Traffic to EPMM with certificates originating from endpoints further inside the network, e.g. standard Windows generated certificates such as `CN=EXCHANGE01` or similar.
4. Perform forensic analysis of disk and memory since log retention may be poor and threat actors have been observed deleting log entries. Pay particular attention to unallocated disk space (free space on filesystem).
5. Check for activity from ASUS routers in your own country towards EPMM and Sentry devices.

## INCIDENT RESPONSE

If compromise is detected, organizations should:

1. Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
2. Reimage compromised hosts.
3. Provision new account credentials.
4. Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
5. Report the compromise to CISA via CISA's 24/7 Operations Center ([report@cisa.gov](mailto:report@cisa.gov) or 888-282-0870) or to NCSC-NO via NCSC-NO's 24/7 Operations Center ([cert@ncsc.no](mailto:cert@ncsc.no) or +47 23 31 07 50).

## MITIGATIONS

CISA and NCSC-NO recommend organizations:

- **Upgrade Ivanti EPMM versions to the latest version** as soon as possible. See [Ivanti CVE-2023-35081 - Remote Arbitrary File Write](#) for patch information. This patch protects against CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081.
  - See the Evidence of Vulnerability Methods section of this advisory for CISA-developed nuclei templates to find any EPMM versions vulnerable to CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081.
  - Organizations using unsupported versions (i.e., versions prior to 11.8.1.0) should immediately upgrade to a supported version. If you cannot immediately upgrade, apply the Ivanti-provided RPM fix for CVE-35078 (this workaround does not protect against CVE-2023-35081):
    1. Login to command line shell (CLI) in enable mode.
    2. Run the following command: `# install rpm url https://support.mobileiron.com/ivanti-updates/ivanti-security-update-1.0.0-1.noarch.rpm`



See Ivanti's [Knowledge Base \(KB\) Remote unauthenticated API access vulnerability - CVE-2023-35078](#) for more information on the RPM fix.

- **Treat MDM systems as high-value assets (HVAs) with additional restrictions and monitoring.** MDM systems provide elevated access to thousands of hosts and should be treated as high value assets (HVAs) with additional restrictions and monitoring.
- **Follow best cybersecurity practices** in production and enterprise environments, including mandating [phishing-resistant multifactor authentication \(MFA\)](#) for all staff and services. For additional best practices, see CISA's [Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals \(CPGs\)](#). The CPGs, developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), are a prioritized subset of IT and OT security practices that can meaningfully reduce the likelihood and impact of known cyber risks and common TTPs. Because the CPGs are a subset of best practices, CISA and NCSC-NO also recommend software manufacturers implement a comprehensive information security program based on a recognized framework, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).

## VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and NCSC-NO recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the [MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise](#) framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1–Table 7).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies' performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA recommends continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

## REFERENCES

- [1] [Ivanti: CVE-2023-35078 – Remote Unauthenticated API Access Vulnerability](#)
- [2] [Ivanti: CVE-2023-35081 – Remote Arbitrary File Write](#)
- [3] [CISA: Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China Tensions](#)
- [4] [CISA: Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](#)

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Ivanti contributed to this joint advisory.

## **VERSION HISTORY**

August 1, 2023: Initial version.

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## APPENDIX: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

NCSC-NO observed the following webshell hash:

```
c0b42bbd06d6e25dfe8faebd735944714b421388
```

NCSC-NO observed the following hash of `mi.war`:

```
1cd358d28b626b7a23b9fd4944e29077c265db46
```

NCSC-NO observed the following JA3 Hashes used against MobileIron Core:

```
2d5bd942ebf308df61e1572861d146f6  
473cd7cb9faa642487833865d516e578  
579ccef312d18482fc42e2b822ca2430  
849d3331f3e07a0797a02f12a6a82aa9  
8d9f7747675e24454cd9b7ed35c58707  
ad55557b7cbd735c2627f7ebb3b3d493  
cd08e31494f9531f560d64c695473da9  
e1d8b04eeb8ef3954ec4f49267a783ef  
e60dc8370ecf78cf115162fbc257baf5  
e669667efb41c36f714c309243f41ca7  
e84a32d43db750b206cb6beed08281d0  
eb5fdc72f0a76657dc6ea233190c4e1c
```

NCSC-NO observed the following JA3 Hashes used against Exchange when tunneling via EPMM Sentry:

```
0092ce298a1d451fbe93dc4237053a96  
00e872019b976e69a874ee7433038754  
01ecd9ab9be75e832c83c082be3bdf18  
0212a88c7ed149febdefa347c610b248  
02be3b93640437dbba47cc7ed5ab7895  
03f8852448a85e14f2b4362194160c32  
045f8ccdac6d4e769b30da406808da71  
04e7f5787f89a597001b50a37b9f8078
```

070f9fe9f0ec69e6b8791d280fde6a48  
07a624d7236cca3934cf1f8e44b74b52  
09df72c01a1a0ad193e2fff8e454c9c4  
0b28842d64a344c287e6165647f3b3fe  
0b8e1211de50d244b89e6c1b366d3ccf  
0cb0380cf75a863b3e40a0955b1ada9f  
0da24834056873a8cd8311000088e8be  
0e1fad8ffaa7a939f0a6cbf9cd7e2fcd  
0f6e78839398c245d13f696a3216d840  
119f8c9050d1499b6f958b857868b8ce  
11c506d5e3fb7e119c4287202c96a930  
1336df27f94b25a25acac9db3e61e461  
14671c3f8deca7d73a03b74cb854c21d  
146caf9bd0153428f54e9ef472154983  
14994353f3ea6fd25952a8c7d57f9ecf  
151bc875df15d1385e6eb02f9edaba06  
15a074a397727b26a846b443b99c20ff  
1660f3d882a4311ca013ee4586e01fd9  
16a74fc216f8a4ce43466bb83b6d3fd2  
188623fdd056c4ed13d1ff34c7377637  
19f51486abd40c9f0fc0503559a6c523  
1a024e63721c610d2e54e67d62cd5460  
1aa7dae8f2ae0a29402ed51819f82db4  
1abfdeaadb74a0f7c461e7bab157b17f  
1b6720ed0b67c910a80722ce973d6217  
1b7d9368c6ce7623fdb43f013626535  
1e0850e10a00c9bbdd5c582ff4cb6833  
1ec71612e438cf902913eec993475eb9  
206fed3a39d9215c35395663f5bb3307  
22cc1b3bc9f99d3a520ae58fee79a0d5  
23e3e6fa8b23d9bc19e82de4e64c79e9  
253fd4659bf21be116858bc0f206c5b9

276e175d4fe8454c4c47e966d8cb3fa3  
289a450c7478dd52a10c6ed2fb47f7e9  
2aa8ba7478b1362274666d714df575bc  
2beecb6b9e386f29d568229a9953c3d2  
2ebc7fdceaa9a0df556e989d77157006  
3003024afe64b4e8a5a30825c14bbb12  
3082e669dda9d023e2dcd8b9549a84a8  
309d33c6f77a3fc75654c44c61596ccd  
30a9f568eb3df79352fc587a078623b6  
30be84e6b95f44c203f8e7fce7339a8e  
3268a5097a543c7dbd82c39a9193b7fe  
32775ead3ea1ad7db2f4bea67fe0cabb  
34ac9a6ef5d285119abec50fbe41fcfe  
34d92552e278710c1e84f0bd8dc3a6b8  
361f47a6357cc6e3a9bcd20cfaaf0e9  
3685abc75517e61e47e52e5f2d060f54  
3744004013135b9f9a05cb58cda8134d  
37d952966ea7e79277803f13d7147544  
391a4c2c7541b8b78e2f99bf586e9794  
393662e5aa0cb49c5d666a6d10a1ade6  
3962b622c5aa815afb803b92aa948424  
3b22af324abded2781ed8f6a61f3654f  
3b30b4555cc8b4b164ad03cf322cbea8  
3bd1bdb5e90b9590a8878bff2ada8204  
3be529eb3a7daaf34f963a22188f6139  
3dd13faad1c45eb0c23e4567210f7eac  
403273b51f91cf3c333695e5532cb2c3  
404f56045e436d53ead2177bf957ba39  
41854adbc73b0b58e5c566f60bb0df25  
43c22dabb1e6d2449a39c2f7e974d537  
476e72bbda5b78d188766139889e3038  
4898a51256ae7d914a5ffd5695973470

49230c486f0fd383cd301fe162d6a786  
4959a611b9885022d81b4bc8e4b1d149  
495c6ff7ca0379ad0891bac47917d09a  
49d2bd08038dc7dada221008591940f9  
4c1b73ec52e6eec0c5d20577fcbc9ef1  
4d34db639ba84b11822fb3dac47ed7d1  
5244b163f9326a1e5eaa8860f7543f99  
539f1a5183800a96228458932f9307f7  
5466368d4659f1b1470bcb09e65b484d  
549cde6535a884126755fc53f59a820c  
555389e92c622b87d3fc395fd8723501  
588d0b42e54174a98e1eca59945e8b32  
58bc21d305a65c41745327f142f3ac12  
59401c9a60449c742d073d93d1b7039a  
59eec218522cc5c7743a0d37892a3345  
59faf75430e9326d3ae9d231bb3ae8c6  
5d0259ca16cfc2d7d1b0fac69f29ab05  
5d55026fb84dba91ac01e2095504b1bc  
5e35f50c692081fd6c7ddac1272e2d6c  
5f4d5965af741bba59b7c8d3425f33dd  
6010282004917ecf3900babf61456432  
6088c2a04c94cdcd5a283a6d1622ffba  
61dee38d2f97220efb1218ad8971e3ab  
62ac194f2526eb45485526bca35c8f43  
634296a023280d020674c873d0199760  
635755dadfab8b92fb502aafb09122db  
63fc58be0d7b48eaa34da7f752ae8ae6  
6441640409815cfb4bf469e685e1bdb5  
646973d1928c401ba80961c12cbf84a2  
65eef0a0ee257254ef0418aa57192cfb  
66f6a192083a7ab00ae8e0b5cc52e8f4  
67a42e2e27ffc26d1f3d0ceb8384afd0

689385f1218e0d4c347595648ca6a776  
692f91c0c5e9e93e0a24bd3392887ca1  
69ecf52960c8bd9e746dfe9ee19c11f6  
6e359f3bbc622e9b1ed36f6e3d521bcf  
6e3650528f719fc50988a1f697644832  
6ead0d5d3f87911c27f3ae0a75e6b5bc  
6f1fa8b444caf0d8238f948279ca74e1  
6fb8cdf567dd7d89d53b5771d769cb5f  
706b6055658aff067ae370f23831ef6b  
708140c311d3d69418f75c928e7535a0  
719ec5da8f2153a436ee8567ff609894  
7292ef4cdca529071fad97496e1c9439  
74871691eac48156ce0da2cfa3ab401a  
74cf24f2a66a31c88b6fcfe01f12160c  
75e874d8e0a79697633b87ea5e798b1c  
76c0d09fed2f33babb0de8ee2c07144c  
77a01363fa2b29af25c004da9570e23c  
78988c65e9b70e7929e747408d8f0b0e  
79c6d12d168b85437384b20eb94e106b  
7b4137b4e85f31a81bb5bafeda993947  
7b9db1d58326c1fa276ba2a39bcc2617  
7cbc7459db5327c26476549f225030f5  
7cd727171c2522f51417edeeba4f1791  
7e3630c67c802eabb67b108ad4d7ded7  
802f5d34c230da40c0912a1c5a9b702b  
80bd0f3610f6c4d60584a5be0b8a3016  
819030799f0020ed724c2ef3ffaa56c6  
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fe9de1cdd645971c5d15ee1873c3ff8d  
febba89b4b9a9649b3a3bf41c4c7d853

NCSC-NO observed the following user agents communicating with Exchange (OWA and EWS):

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0  
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)  
Chrome/92.0.4515.131 Safari/537.36 Edg/92.0.902.67

NCSC-NO observed the following user agents communicating with Exchange webshell:

Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; U; CPU iPhone OS 4\_0\_1 like Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/532.9 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0.5 Mobile/8A306 Safari/6531.22.7  
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en-US; rv:1.8.0.7) Gecko/20060909 Firefox/1.5.0.7  
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; Moto C Build/NRD90M.059) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100 Mobile Safari/537.36  
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)  
Chrome/41.02272.101 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.1.1; SAMSUNG SM-J120M Build/LMY47X) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, Like Gecko) SamsungBrowser/6.4 Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Mobile Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 9\_0\_2 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/601.1.45 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.0 Mobile/13A452 Safari/601.1

NCSC-NO observed the following user agents communicating with Exchange Autodiscover:

ExchangeServicesClient/15.00.0913.015

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.131 Safari/537.36 Edg/92.0.902.67

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Firefox/114.0

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/114.0.0.0

NCSC-NO observed the following user agents communicating with EWS (/ews/Exchange.asmx):

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.114 Safari/537.36 Edg/103.0.1264.49

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.131 Safari/537.36 Edg/92.0.902.67

NCSC-NO observed the following user agent communicating with Exchange (/powershell):

Windows WinRM Client